Reserves Hoarding in Banking Industry: Explaining the African Paradox
Pawessé Louis Arnaud Tamini  1@  , Joël Petey  2  
1 : Laboratoire de recherche en gestion et économie  (LARGE)  -  Site web
université de Strasbourg
Pôle européen de gestion (PEGE) 61, avenue de la Forêt -Noire 67085 STRASBOURG CEDEX -  France
2 : Laboratoire de recherche en gestion et économie
université de Strasbourg : EA2364

In this paper, we explain why banks in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are hoarding reserves while firms struggle to access to credit. We hypothesize that the lack of demand for credit, and the instability of deposits are the main drivers of reserves hoarding by banks. First, using the credit market disequilibrium framework, we find that in SSA the total supply of credit is not fully absorbed by the market suggesting a disequilibrium induced by the demand. Second, using this disequilibrium in addition to the volatility of deposits, we explain the reserves hoarding by banks in SSA. The results support our hypotheses, confirming that the weakness of demand combined with the instability of deposits lead banks to hold excess liquidity in SSA. Our results suggest that a better risk management framework, and policies allowing to soften the access to credit market may lead bank to displace the reserves towards the private sector.


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